Archive for August 2007
I hope I’m giving enough disclaimers so that no one can possibly be fooled into thinking I actually know what I’m talking about, but I continue trying to absorb as much as I can as events unfold.
I know very little about financial statements and most of my comments on the subject of corporate leverage have been guided by simplistically thinking about basic human nature. For example, in this post
I stated (emphasis added in bold)
I’ve heard economists blabber about how strong corporate balance sheets are as they have decreased leverage since 2000-2001, but these same economists have absolutely no clue about CDOs and other avenues for off balance sheet implied leverage. In my opinion, the only thing holding default rates down was the availability of easy credit, not some increased sense of corporate responsibility. I think we will find that most corporations are more highly leveraged than balance sheets would suggest.
And in this comment, I said:
What you say about FAS 140 and particularly securitized mortgage products makes perfect sense. I don’t disagree, but my thinking is that there is something else less obvious related to FAS 140 (or at least off-balance sheet exposures) that will crop up once default rates pickup again. We’ll see. Like I said, I don’t have anything more to support the idea than basic human greed on the part of corporate executives during a period of easy credit.
Maybe I was looking in the wrong place, but my instinct may not have been too far off. Here is a very interesting article via Portfolio.com
Maybe instead of looking for sneaky off-balance sheet stuff, maybe it is right there in front of our eyes. “Fair value accounting” seems quite amenable to “asset price inflation”. If asset prices are inflated, this would make corporate leverage seem muted. A situation that could be quickly reversed. Hmm…
Back in the dark ages when I was a physics major, I was probably even more stubborn than I am today. I would routinely reject theories that were taught to me and try to think about how things really should be. I would occasionally come up with whacky ideas only to later discover that other physicists much more talented than I (since I had no talent) had come up with the same or similar ideas one hundred years or more earlier. Now that I spend a considerable amount of time thinking about markets and economies, I am quite certain it would be nearly impossible to come up with a “new” idea, but it doesn’t stop me from trying. One of my ideas, which is admittedly not very deep, is that monetary policy should not necessarily attempt to avoid recessions. Recessions can actually be good for long term growth. A concept, I’ve been referring to as economic Darwinism for lack of a better word.
That is why it was so cool to see the recent article in The Economist
Thanks to The Float.
A necessary evil
But should a central bank always try to avoid recessions? Some economists argue that this could create a much wider form of moral hazard. If long periods of uninterrupted expansions lead people to believe that the Fed can prevent any future recession, consumers, firms, investors and borrowers will be encouraged to take bigger risks, borrowing more and saving less. During the past quarter century the American economy has been in recession for only 5% of the time, compared with 22% of the previous 25 years. Partly this is due to welcome structural changes that have made the economy more stable. But what if it is due to repeated injections of adrenaline every time the economy slows?
PS: I’ve been ignorantly harsh on both Greenspan and Bernanke, but I have to say that I am quite impressed with Bernanke’s recent performance maneuvering through the current credit crisis. I expect him to hold the target rate at 5.25% on September 18. If he does, I’ll gladly apologize for anything less-than-flattering I’ve ever said about him. If he lowers rates, I’ll lose respect and throw him back in the Greenspan “save my Wall Street buddies” bucket.
An interesting article from the WSJ:
Now, I am an admitted amateur when it comes to macroeconomics and asset management. I did have a pretty fantastic immersion in the subjects for two years, but realistically, what can you learn in two years when you are starting from basically zero? Not much. But I’m continuing to learn and be fascinated by them.
I’ve learned enough at this point though that I can start to be irritating by voicing my amateurish opinions. One of my amateurish opinions was that a “fight to quality” may not include the typical safe haven, i.e. US treasuries. Of course I got scoffed at and had raw vegetables thrown at me for being so hysterical. I’ve written about it here so far
I’ve also talked about a possible reversal of the oil savings glut here:
I’ve also pointed to an interesting Times article, US financial watchdog says economy at risk from ‘non-ally’ bondholders here:
Anyway, there is a bit of all of this rolled up into one in the WSJ article above. Here are a few snippets:
The investments he has since pursued put his fund at the forefront of far-reaching change in how the oil wealth of the Persian Gulf is deployed. Instead of mostly U.S. Treasury securities, Kuwait now invests in things like higher-yielding bonds, Chinese office buildings and Asian private-equity funds. And, in a move with implications for the strength of the U.S.’s currency and economy, the Kuwait fund is de-emphasizing holdings priced in dollars.
Mr. Al-Sa’ad learned that Yale was 28% in stocks, 17% in private-equity funds and 20% in real estate at the time. Kuwait was 2.5% in real estate and 1.5% in private-equity funds. The bulk of its money was in U.S. Treasurys. Despite that hoard, the fund had enough losses elsewhere that its returns were negative in 2001 and 2002, Mr. Al-Sa’ad says.
“We must deploy the money in a way to keep Kuwait going when the oil is gone,” Mr. Al-Sa’ad says. “We don’t have the cheap labor of China or the services of Switzerland or the efficiency of Singapore.”
That shift might lower the appetite for low-yielding investments such as the bonds the U.S. government must sell in large numbers to finance its budget and trade deficits. All else being equal, reduced buying of Treasurys and other U.S. securities would tend to weaken the dollar and make U.S. exports more competitive globally, but also burden businesses and consumers in the U.S. by pushing up interest rates.
As Mr. Al-Sa’ad moves away from assets priced in dollars, the euro and the pound sterling, he is moving toward the South Korean won, Malaysian ringgit and Indian rupee. The yen is his least-favorite currency, though, because it’s so volatile. When he was a young trader, he says, he used to get up at 3 a.m. and trade the Japanese currency. “I don’t remember a day I made money trading yen,” he says. “This currency made my hair white.”
Meanwhile, Kuwait’s central bank also has less need to buy U.S. dollars. In June, Kuwait stopped pegging its dinar to the dollar. So Kuwait no longer needs to buy dollars to keep its currency from rising when cash pours in to pay for oil exports. The dinar has appreciated about 2.5% against the dollar since the link was cut.
All very interesting, at least from the perspective of an admitted amateur armchair analyst 🙂
Another 16 hour day! Phew! Kick @$$!!
Anyway, although I should be sleeping, I decided to compose another stream of consciousness over at NP.
“In my opinion, the CDO market is history.”
[From RRP:]Eric, this is the kind of stuff that you say that drives me nuts.
Come on. Admit it. This is exactly the worry that has driven you to drink and you know it
Look at it from the flip side. You’re a pension fund or university endowment. Why would you invest in CDOs? Because they have a good credit rating and provide an attractive yield compared to other AAAs. Do you really think these guys are going to continue falling for the same joke? Do ratings agencies have any credibility left? How can a pension fund manager look at their retired investors in the eyes and tell them that CDOs are as good as GE debt? Senior citizens are losing their livelihoods. That smells like political action to me.
The ONLY reason for the existence of CDOs as far as I can tell is “ratings arbitrage”. That boat has sailed.
There is no doubt the underlying cashflows are good, but the justification for the existence of tranches is diminishing. Why invest in something that the smartest people on the planet do not understand when you could invest in the same cashflows with less hokus pokus, i.e. untranched structured products, e.g. vanilla MBS, ABS? In crises, it seems the more exotic fringe products disappear and the surviving assets will eventually become commoditized.
I think the CDO market is going to effectively disappear because the newly found liquidity premium will swamp out even the most optimistic present value analysis making it uneconomical to issue. I could certainly be wrong.
I do not know the mechanism by which this could occur, but just thinking aloud, it makes a certain amount of sense for a servicer to repackage a CDO into a more palatable structure. That way, they could at least make a market even if it isn’t selling voodoo to senior citizens.
Having said all that, if the liquidity premium does force a drastic reduction (or complete halt) in CDO issuance, then those with the guts to buy up whatever is left at bargain basement prices will make a total killing as long as they have the patience (and freedom) to sit back and collect the cashflows (with no intention of selling). If I had the luxury of a lot of cash sitting around, I would be circling over head.
Good night and keep up the good fight!
[From RRP:]First of all, best wishes to your daughter on her birthday. One of the benefits of living in Southern California is close proximity to Disneyland.
Thanks dude. We had a blast. There must have been a “Goth” convention nearby or something because 10% of the people in the park looked like they were straight out of deathrock concert or something. An interesting contrast to Cinderella
Sorry if I misinterpreted your comments, but things like
“you should do it here, in the phorum instead of running to your blog”
“If you weren’t so self congratulatory on all of your “calls” about the market”
“you’re coming across, to me at least, as a dilettante who has never taken a risk position in his life”
“this is not some random trash bin on the internet where anyone can say whatever pops into their head and not have to defend it”
“The problem I have with second guessers is that they generally are the last to the party and the first to point out how shitty it is”
do not seem very conducive to a decent conversation. Not only is it grossly inaccurate, but I think we can all do without sheah like that. I really hope that it stops, but if you want to continue, please do so on the blog so that it does not pollute this phorum. I’m more than happy to answer there. It’s not running to the blog. It’s more like trying to filter sheah like that from here.
Like I said in my <tj>, I’m happy to answer to comments here, but just consider that others may not be interested in our tete a tete and think about taking it elsewhere (you know where).
Anyway, so here’s your comment:
Dude, what started me on this thread was some throw away comment you made about Bernanke at least not being as bad as Greenspan. I asked you to elaborate, you responded about how Greenspan would have cut the rate 1% already. My response was to post data that shows the fed reaction in 1998, which I felt to be mos t similar to this crisis; 3 cuts starting 2 months after the onset of the crisis. You countered that 2001 was the best comp to this market, now I didn’t agree with you on that, and I told you why 1998 felt more like this than 2001. If you want to believe that I’m just saying you’re a n00b and should shut up, your perogative. What I’m really meaning to say is that you’re totally lacking perspective in most of your views. Perspective that comes with experience. It is showing plainly.
When you lack direct perspective, the best you can do is to pay attention to others who have perspective. I didn’t post a link to the source of some of my thoughts because I’ve been accused of posting links simply to suport my arguments. WTP. In grad school, I called that citing references, but I guess that doesn’t fly in the real world of old timers.
kr picked up on it. No surprise. I was referring to Roubini’s latest stuff. Sure he is a certified bear and has been for a long time. In fact, he’s so gloomy even I had to unsubscribe from his RSS feed because I couldn’t handle it any more. Just because he’s gloomy doesn’t mean you shouldn’t pay attention to him once in a while though. He is a super sharp guy and hearing him speak on BBG TV did impress me. He is certainly not a whack job.
That is a fantastic article and I agree with him wholeheartedly. When you held up 1998 as a comparison, I was immediately skeptical because it’s in direct contrast to someone else that I think knows his stuff better than either of us.
It really sucks when you compare me to these “second guessers” or those “late to the party”. Have a look at what I wrote here:
I was concerned (for good reason) about credit markets going back to no later than December last year. It wasn’t until the following March-April that I actually had my models built to give some empirical support. I started trying to make a case and practically begged my research directors to let me work with the high yield analysts, but was shot down because of other high-priority projects going on. When Bear Stearns’ HFs imploded things were obvious.
Now, I know I’ve said that at least twice now and some are definitely sick of hearing it, but PLEASE do not think I’m being self congratulatory. I said some things which irritated some people who were probably losing money and then started seeing some baseless judgements coming down on me. I think I’m entitled to stand up and try to set the record straight without these straw man jabs.
There are MANY valid reasons to criticize me, but “self congratulatory”, “second guesser” and certainly “dilettante who has never taken a risk position in his life” are not among them. You yourself named a particularly strong counter example. Yeah, I am %$#%ing scared about my career decision. I left a cushy place working with fantastic people. I had my own plush office with a great view and my own phriggin secretary for Cartan’s sake, but I had my reasons. Now I couldn’t find a post-it note to save my life, but I’ve got a good title with a good company with a significantly better mark to market. We’ll see how I pull through, but one thing I know about myself is that I’m a survivor. I’ve come a long ways from the days of being practically homeless, living in the physics study room and surviving off microwaved potatoes.
Anyway, I hope you are somewhat satisfied with my previous post regarding some of the differences between today and 1998 (which were borrowed heavily from Roubini… no apologies for that). It’s not like subprime mortgages are such a huge part of the markets (they obviously are not) and we’re seeing “contagion”. It’s more like a bunch of sand castles of lax credit standard be swallowed one by one in a rising tide of risk premium. Subprime was the first such sand castle to go. High yield is probably next.
The “I warned you” comment was certainly tongue in cheek, but what happened? The market did shut down, right? It’s good you got those two deals out in July, but where are they trading now? In my opinion, the CDO market is history. Existing (tranched) deals will probably need to be unpackaged into the more vanilla (untranched) structured products from which they were born. Is there any precedent for that? Has a CMO ever gotten deconstructed into its constituent assets? [Not a rhetorical question. I’d like to know.]
Anyway. Wild times. I may be out of a job sooner than you know, but even if that were to happen, I would still think I made the right decision to leave my previous place.
Got this via the good guys over at Econocator:
Merrill Lynch – The Credit Monitor
“Easy money” is the root cause of current credit volatility. While mortgage finance, Hedge Funds, LBO’s, Yen-based financing, SIVs/Conduits and CDOs have all been cited as sources of structural leverage they are derivative of the 1% funds rate policy from the early part of this decade. As the Fed began the process of removing excess monetary liquidity, market participants simply manufactured it with financial leverage.
This process was seven years in the making. We doubt it will be unwound in two months time. We caution investors: beware of false recoveries.
The irony is not lost on us: last week’s apparent short-lived recovery in credit spreads was prompted by rising expectations of a 2007 Fed rate cut. Yet, it is the 1% “easy money” Fed Funds rate policy that is the origin of many of the current structural problems in the credit market. A rate cut seems like a curious solution to a problem that was incubated by liquidity. Moreover, the currency outcome could prove troubling. Should credit rally on such an action, it may serve as an opportunity to add new shorts/underweights.
Band wagon? Or people just waking up after a long period of delusions?
What a week!! I certainly picked a good time to start a new job in structured finance. It’s only my first week and I’ve already had two 16 hour days where I was in the office until after midnight 😮
Actually, I love it! I love the intensity and love pushing myself. Reminds me of grad school 😉
Anyway, the big news from the Fed last week was the lowering of the discount rate. Over on NP, I voiced my opinion in a brief statement:
I think it is a smart move. The first sign that Bernanke isn’t as bad as Greenspan.
I thought it was an innocuous enough statement, but apparently Greenspan has a lot of fans out there. I was immediately greeted with:
Care to elaborate on this? I agree that boosting liquidity even modestly right now will be extremely helpful but I’m not sure that G-Span would have acted differently in this circumstance. Sure he was a bit compulsive about inflation but he gave the system liquidity when it really needed it. In 98 after Russia the discount window borrowing rate went from 5 to 4.50. Same magnitude move we are seeing here. You do realize that the target rate isn’t changing, the secured lending rate is?
I’d like to know what IAmEric is going on about as well. Greenspan was adamant about making sure that bubbles didn’t end up as complete disasters. He was well known to provide liquidity in times of crisis. So how is Bernanke better than Greenspan?
I’d also like to hear IAE’s reasoning…
Then, I replied with what I thought was a reasonable succinct explanation:
Greenspan would have already cut the Fed rate by 1% (or more). That kind of behavior is what got us here. Cutting the discount rate while keeping the target rate at 5.25% makes sense. Nothing more nothing less.
This is where I think RRP got a little out of line, but hey, we are all adults, right? No biggie.
Please, don’t let facts get in the way of your hyperbole but a quick check would reveal this to be pretty much untrue. Taking 98 (which was worse than this crisis has been to this point) to be a good comp (an article of faith no doubt, but bear with me) we saw three rate cuts for a total of 75bps by mid november. This is a full 3 months after the default and two months after things started getting extremely nasty. Lo and behold target rates were back to pre crisis levels by mid November 99. It looks like an effective use of policy to get through a crisis to me.
Now you can fall into the camp that will blame the fed policy for the run-up in home prices and ultimately the housing bubble. That’s well and good, but cheap fed funds do not a bubble make. It takes a great deal of complacancy from the whole financial community to ignore the facts which are now so blindingly obvious and had been obvious to most people paying attention for the past 5 years. If you want to make a substantial loan to somebody and require less verification than it would take to get a Sears card be my guest, just don’t cry to me when you get hurt. There’s a lot of pain out there right now and there’s not a single fucking person feeling it who doesn’t deserve it. Idiotic borrowers, opportunistic originators, greedy investors, lax rating agencies, traders with tunnel vision, bankers with short time horizons, every last one of them is getting stomped (including yours truly). It’s their own goddamned fault so don’t put it at old Alan’s doorstep.
And for the record, I’m not in the camp that thinks Greenspan is one step removed from Jesus, I just belive he performed more than adequately in an extremely difficult job.
I’m really not sure what kind of logic it takes to look at the historical funds rate as evidence against my “opinion” that Greenspan would have already dropped rates by a “1% (or more)” in the last 5 months. I replied with:
You are certainly entitled to your opinion. I hope it has served you well. Comparing this to 1998 may be justified, maybe not. I think not.
The data you yourself supplied shows 8 – 50 bp drops and 3 – 25 bps drops in 2001 alone. ABX tanked in Feb-March. I think Greenspan would have thrown in a few 50 basis pointers during the last 5 months. It’s just my opinion and as we all know, that is what this entire industry is built on, i.e. art versus science.
Then energetic chimed in with…
I think Greenspan would have thrown in a few 50 basis pointers during the last 5 months.
Eric, dude …
I could only afford one last comment before being buried in modeling…
Look at the data man! If anyone should be frustrated, it should be me. I don’t blame people for talking their books though.
Edit: Here is the data for 2001
December 11 – Rate cut 25 bps to 1.75
November 6 – Rate cut 50 bps to 2.00
October 2 – Rate cut 50 bps to 2.50
September 17 – Rate cut 50 bps to 3.00
August 21 – Rate cut 25 bps to 3.50
June 27 – Rate cut 25 bps to 3.75
May 15 – Rate cut 50 bps to 4.00
April 18 – Rate cut 50 bps to 4.50
March 20 – Rate cut 50 bps to 5.00
January 31 – Rate cut 50 bps to 5.50
January 3 – Rate cut 50 bps to 6.00
RRP chose to argue against a Greenspan “1% (or more)” rate cut by pointing at 1998 (as if today somehow resembles 1998). Using similar logic (which admittedly isn’t very sound), I pointed at 2001. That is not to say I think today’s environment resembles 2001, but was simply meant to point out that
the Fed Greenspan could have a lead foot when it comes to rate cuts in times of “crisis”, which I think current events count as.
Then the fun started:
So, you want to compare the current crisis with the aftermath of .com collapse? AFAIC, this is a bad model, but you would agree, would you not, that there was a considerable delay in Fed reaction even then?
IAE, regarding 2001, comon man… that was a recession with 9/11 thrown on top to boot. Where is the comparison?
[From RRP: (my emphasis in bold)]
And I tend to agree with him. But seriously, this is not some random trash bin on the internet where anyone can say whatever pops into their head and not have to defend it.
So in the spirit of fairness here is whyI think that this is more similar to 98 than not (and coincidentally 98% of the people I’ve spoken to on this are in agreement).
- Seemingly isolated events torching unrelated markets
- Deals ground to a halt
- Media panic about shadowy hedge funds toppling the global financial markets
- Decrying the fed bail out that has yet to materialize
- The feeling that there is no end in sight
- Summer totally getting fucked; My drinking is purely therapeutic at this point and not for recreation
Please let me know why you don’t think it’s similar. And just an aside in my youth, some really old dudes informed me that everyone thinks the first market crisis they experience is really new new new when in fact history repeats itself more than we’d like to admit. It’s just better sales to say we’ve never seen anything like this before, making the same mistake twice appears really really dumb for some reason.
As for 2001 and this being similar, or similar enough to compare fed reactions, please elaborate. Seriously, people got what the hell was going on there, equity markets were getting trounced on the heels of the dot com shutdown but fixed income was in fine shape. Business investment dried up very quickly. This whole irrational exuberance drum was getting pounded before the equities collapse(Greenspan 96). Again, not that it matters if you are ultimately right, because if you miss out on the way up you’re not going to keep your job long enough to be vindicated. Also to the point 2001 was a reaction to fundamental economics, 98 was a reaction to a crisis in confidence. Two different animals in my book. Sir Appleby, I don’t necessarily disagree with you on the Drexel thing but 91 was really a recession as well and I think trying to separate the fed motives for liquidity provision vs. managing targets for key economic variables is a little tougher task. Plus I was just getting pubes in 91 so I don’t have a lot of knowledge of it.
The problem I have with second guessers is that they generally are the last to the party and the first to point out how shitty it is. It’s easy to criticize and hard to create, I mean really are you really disappointed with the Greenspan track record en total from 87 to 06? What would you have done differently? Why do you think things would have turned out better?
Wow. What can I say? That is just real %$#^ed up. To be fair, RRP is probably sitting on a portfolio of CDOs and is understandly not in such a great mood these days (even though I did warn him long ago) 😉
It didn’t end there though. Tabris, ironically speaking of jumping on band wagons, had this to say:
Now with regards to the Fed discount rate, we can all speculate on what G-span would have done (my bet on 25bps cut next meeting if G-span still in office) but it is really a moot point. The fact is, Big Ben is beginning to realise the issue they are having in liquidity and is taking pre-cautionary steps in correcting the LIQUIDITY problem. They are not bailing out HFs or mortgage clowns as HFs will still blow up and Mortgage clowns still have to sit on their bed of toxic subprime loans. Nothing more, nothing less…
Now, less bandwagon jumping, and more evident based debate please.
RRP, you have my respect for being one of the few guys trying to bring this debate back from the pits. Drinks on me next time!
Then, last night before hitting the sack after a very long week, I posted the following:
Why is this not like 1998? In 1998, it was a “liquidity” event. As such, pumping liquidity into the markets does make a certain amount of sense. What is unfolding now is a combination of “liquidity event” with a bursting “credit bubble”. It is not a “mortgage” issue that has spread. Rather, it is a general “fixed income bubble” that is bursting. THAT is different and that will not be made better by pumping the system with liquidity. You can argue all you want (and you’re certainly entitled to) that the Fed had nothing to do with inflating the credit bubble since 2000-2001. You’d be in good company. Conversely, if you thought the Fed’s policies encouraged the credit bubble, you’d also be in good company.
That is the kind of conversation that can be potentially interesting. One where you have super sharp and experienced people on both sides of the aisle with completely opposite views on things. As I’ve said before, I subscribe to the concept of “economic Darwinism” and that a recession now and then is a good thing for long term growth. I am in good company on that one. I particularly enjoyed Andy Xie’s recent piece:
If central banks try to bail out Wall Street, it would lead to high inflation for years. The inflationary effect of loose monetary policy of the past was offset by the deflationary effect of globalisation. Now China and other developing countries are experiencing high and rising inflation. Loose money will go straight into inflation. The vicious cycle of the wage-price spiral of the 1970s has not occurred as both labour and capital still believe in the inflation- fighting credibility of the central banks. If they loosen up again to bail out Wall Street, this credibility may be squandered. The ensuing wage-price spiral could ruin the global economy for years to come.
What is occurring is an opportunity for central banks to restore their credibility. Markets have been taking more risk than they should because they believe that central banks will come to their aid during times of crisis, like now. The penchant of Alan Greenspan, former US Federal Reserve chairman, to flood the market with liquidity during financial instability is the genesis of this “central bank put”. As long as this expectation remains, financial bubbles will occur again and again. Now is the time to act. Let the crooks go bankrupt. Central banks should bury the Greenspan “put” for good.
Band wagon? There certainly may be a lot of that going on these days, but I hope you don’t put me in that category. Just read what I’ve said over the last couple of months. Private equity? LBOs? CLOs? Structured finance in general? High yield? Those might be headlines now, but they certainly weren’t back when I first began blabbering about them (Maybe it was incoherent blabbering, but blabbering all the same). The first time I began publicly voicing my opinion about Bernanke and Greenspan was on July 3 in the “Liquidity Liquidity Everywhere” thread (and no, I am not running around in glee ).
Greenspan and Bernanke are both wankers. I call it “forest fire monetary policy” (there is probably a better academic name). It is better to let the forest burn once in a while in a controlled blaze then to let timber build up over years and years. That situation can only end in inferno.
Believe me, I had been arguing with economists and other analysts about the point far earlier than that. [Sidenote: If you are a noob to monetary policy, but would like to a know a bit about what its all about, I highly recommend A Term at the Fed.] Not that any of that matters, I just felt like debunking the “band wagon” statement, which is a bit like setting up a straw man, don’t you think?
And I’m certainly not criticizing in bad times and chearleading in good. I’ve been warning anybody who would listen about CDOs since the moment I learned about them (and have the well-received research reports to prove it). And now that the sheah has hit the fan, I’ve joined a structured finance group. One reason being that I know there are some great opportunities and working through this time will be a killer learning experience. Having said that, I still wouldn’t touch a CDO with a 10 foot pole, but there is more to structured finance than toxic voodoo magic.
Anyway, it seems that jumping on “IAmEric” has become an increasingly popular recreation sport on NP these days, and since I value the community there, I still want to avoid senseless rants or jibes against my comments which just distracts from the conversation (and decreases the likelihood of having an actual valuable contribution from kr or Bachelier etc). So… I recreated the relevant parts of the conversation here. Have at it! That is what blogs are for. Give me what you got 😉